Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus starts as a book on logic and (the limits of) language. Initially it was read as a work on logic, aiming to put an end to nonsensical language and all kinds of metaphysical speculation. But the book has also an ethical purpose and mentions the ‘mystical’ several times. Wittgenstein sets out to show that these are subjects we cannot speak (and should be silent) about. So what do these remarks mean? Wittgenstein emphasizes that these are his remarks (‘my propositions’), and this turns out to be crucial for understanding the fundamental paradox in his work.
In The Practice of Everyday Life Michel de Certeau (1925-1996) discusses Wittgenstein’s model of ordinary language. Certeau points out the primary historical context of Wittgenstein’s thought. This science of the ordinary is defined by foreignness. Wittgenstein himself always remained a foreigner, away from home. Wittgenstein’s position resembles the situation of Labadie the Nomad that Certeau describes in The Mystic Fable. It is the position of the wild mystic.